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NOTES
CIVIL RIGHTS-SECTION 1983---WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION
AV AILABILITY OF DAMAGES IN EXCESS OF THOSE PERMITTED
UNDER STATE LAw-Jones v. Hildebrant, 550 P.2d 339 (Colo.
1976), cert. granted, 429 U.S. 1061, cert. dismissed, 432 U.S. 189
(1977).
The plaintiff in Jones V. Hildebrant 1 was the mother of a fif
teen year-old black youth who was shot and killed by an on-duty
Denver police officer. In her complaint against Officer Hildebrant,
the City of Denver, and the County of Denver, Mrs. Jones as
serted three causes of action. The first two claims, based on the
Colorado wrongful death statute,2 were for the intentional and neg
ligent killing of her son. The third cause of action, based on 42
U.S.c. § 1983,3 alleged the intentional deprivation of her son's
civil rights without due process of law. 4 Mrs. Jones claimed that
her son's right to life, to freedom from physical abuse and intimida
tion, and to the equal protection of the laws had been violated. 5
She sought $1,500,000 in compensatory damages and $250,000 in
punitive damages. 6

1. 550 P.2d 339 (Colo. 1976), cert. granted, 429 U.S. 1061, cerl. dismissed as
improvidently granted, 432 U.S. 189 (1977).
2. COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-202 (1973) provides:
When the death of a person is caused by a wrongful act, neglect, or default
of another, and the act, neglect, or default is such as would, if death had not
ensued, have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover
damages in respect thereof, then, and in every such case, the person who or
the corporation which would have been liable, if death had not ensued, shall
be liable in an action for damages notwithstanding the death of the party
injured.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Con
stitution and Laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
4. 550 P.2d at 341.
5. [d. at 345.
6. [d. at 341.
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The trial court ruled that her section 1983 claim "merged"7 with
the claims under the Colorado wrongful death statute and dismissed
it as a separate cause of action. 8 Furthermore, the court ruled that
the wrongful death statute did not permit recovery of punitive
damages. 9 Her recovery was limited to net pecuniary loss up to a
maximum of $45,00010 since she was not a dependent of the de
ceased. l1 The wrongful death claim went to the jury which re
turned a verdict for Mrs. Jones and awarded her $1,500. 12
On appeal Mrs. Jones' primary contention was that her section
1983 claim should not have been dismissed because it arguably
would have permitted her to recover damages in excess of the net
pecuniary loss ceiling imposed by the state wrongful death rem
edy.13 Affirming the trial court's rulings, the Colorado Supreme
Court held that no section 1983 remedy for wrongful death exists
independently of the state statute and that the net pecuniary loss
7.

See note 16 infra.
550 P.2d at 341.
9. Id.
ID. Id. The jury was instructed that the damages recoverable were limited to
net pecuniary loss up to a $45,000 ceiling in a wrongful death action in which the
decedent was a minor child. This common law rule was first articulated in Her
bertson v. Russell, 150 Colo. 1l0, 371 P.2d 422 (1962). In the instant case, the court
defined net pecuniary loss as the financial loss suffered by the plaintiff as a result of
her child's death. It was to include the value of any services the child might have
performed for the plaintiff, such as working around the home and running errands,
less the expenses the plaintiff would have incurred in raising him. 550 P.2d at 341
n.1. Recovery is not permitted for parental grief and loss of society. Id. at 342.
11. Id. at 341.
12. Id. In the instant case, the award apparently included funeral expenses.
The Colorado Supreme Court upheld the instructions and the award. Id. at 341 n.1.
13. Id. Mrs. Jones offered several theories in support of this contention. She
argued the implied existence of a wrongful death remedy directly under § 1983.Id.
at 342. See text accompanying notes 25-27 infra. She also contended the Colorado
damage limitation did not apply to a § 1983 claim even when the state wrongful
death statute is incorporated into the federal claim. 550 P.2d at 343. See note 26 infra
and accompanying text. Aside from the wrongful death claim, she contended the
dismissal of the § 1983 action prevented her from asserting a survival claim and a
claim based on the loss of her own personal liberty to raise her child without unlaw
ful interference from the state. 550 P.2d at 342. In the alternative, she argued that
the damages awarded were inadequate as a matter of law. Id.
Mrs. Jones was unsuccessful in her attempt to assert the survival and parenthood
claims. The Colorado Supreme Court held that no survival action under § 1983 exists
independently of state law and that a mother cannot sue in her own right for depriva
tion of her constitutional right to raise her child. Id. at 345. But see Mattis v. Schnarr,
502 F.2d 588 (8th Cir. 1974), and Jones v. McElroy, 429 F. Supp. 848 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
Relying on Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923), these two courts have allowed plaintiffs to assert causes of action
under § 1983 for loss of the right to parenthood. See note 21 infra.
8.
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rule was properly applied. 14 The court reasoned that if the action
had been brought in federal court the Colorado wrongful death
statute would have been "incorporated" into the section 1983 ac
tion. 15 However, since the suit was brought in state court, the sec
tion 1983 action "merged"16 into the "broader" state claim. 17 This
holding rested on the apparent assumption that the state remedy
was the broader one since it, unlike section 1983, allowed the City
and County of Denver to be sued as well as the individual defen
dant. 1s
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 19 to de
cide whether a state's damage limitation controls in a wrongful
death action brought pursuant to section 1983. 20 However, in a per
curiam opinion, the Court dismissed as improvidently granted Mrs.
Jones' petition for certiorari. 21 Thus, the United States Supreme
Court has left unresolved the extent to which section 1983 provides
a state court remedy when a police officer wrongfully takes a life. 22
The following discussion capsulizes the development of remedies
for wrongful death under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act. It
examines the conceptual difficulties which have caused an unequal
availability of these remedies, questions the Colorado Supreme
Court's understanding of federal procedure, and suggests alterna
tive resolutions of the issues presented in the case.
14. 550 P.2d at 344.
15. ld. See note 27 infra for an explanation of "incorporation."
16. In the law relating to rights of action, when a person takes or acquires a
remedy of a higher nature, in legal estimation a broader remedy, than the one he
already possesses for the same right, then his remedies in respect of the minor right
merge in those attaching to the higher one. The less important remedy ceases to
have an independent existence. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1140 (rev. 4th ed. 1976).
17. 550 P.2d at 344.
18. ld. at n.7. Municipalities are immune to suit under § 1983. Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167 (1961). The ruling of the Colorado Supreme Court is correct only if the
net pecuniary loss rule was properly applied to the § 1983 claim. If the damage
limitation does not apply, the § 1983 remedy is broader in one sense since it allows
the plaintiff to recover damages in excess of the net pecuniary loss limitation. See
note 30 infra for a discussion of a state court's obligation to enforce federal law.
19. 429 U.S. 1061 (1977).
20. 432 U.S. 183, 184-85 (1977).
21. ld. at 189. In the majority view, Mrs. Jones' only argument before the Court
was one she did not raise in her petition for certiorari: that her personal liberty to
raise her child without interference from the state had been infringed. See note 13
supra. The dissent reasoned that this issue, as well as the damage limitation issue,
was sufficiently preserved on appeal to the Colorado Supreme Court and was prop
erly raised in her petition for certiorari. 432 U.S. at 194.
22. State courts are likely to have an increasingly important role in the adjudi
cation of § 1983 claims. See note 105 infra.
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WRONGFUL DEATH ACTIONS

Incorporation of State Law into Section 1983 Wrongful Death
Actions Brought in Federal Courts

The basic issue before the Colorado Supreme Court was the
nature of the wrongful death remedy available in actions brought
under section 1983. The court ruled correctly that no section 1983
remedy for wrongful death exists independently of state statutes. 23
It observed that federal courts presiding over section 1983 actions,
in order to provide remedies for wrongful death, "incorporate"
state wrongful death statutes into the section 1983 cause of action.
This allows wrongful death actions to be brought under the federal
statute where, but for the death of the injured party, the federal
tort remedy would have been available.
This approach was first taken by the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit in Brazier v. Cherry.24 There, the court considered
the legislative policy behind the Civil Rights Act, and reasoned
that "it defies history to conclude that Congress purposely meant to
assure to the living freedom from such unconstitutional depriva
tions, but that, with like precision, it meant to withdraw [that] pro
tection . . . [from an injury resulting in death]. "25 Having deter
mined that Congress intended to prohibit violence which kills as
well as violence which injures,26 the Brazier court searched for
23. 550 P.2d at 344-45. In Insurance Co. v. Brame, 95 U.S. 754 (1877), the
United States Supreme Court recognized that no action for wrongful death exists in
the common law. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 377-93
(1970), for an historical analysis of this rule. As a result of the rule, it was held that
no action for wrongful death could lie under § 1983 because that statute does not
expressly authorize such a remedy. Federal courts sitting in § 1983 actions have
responded by "incorporating" state wrongful death statutes into § 1983 actions. See
text accompanying notes 24-34 infra. The same result has been reached by courts
deciding the issue in other areas of federal law which do not expressly provide a
wrongful death remedy in their statutory schemes. See, e.g., The Harrisburg, 119
U.S. 199 (1886) (in the absence of a statute there is no action for wrongful death in
federal maritime law). The Harrisburg was overruled in Moragne v. States Marine
Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970). See notes 57-58 infra and accompanying text. '
24. 293 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1961).
25. Id. at 404. See id. at n.9 for a comparison of criminal sanctions recognizing
criminal accountability for injuries resulting in the death' of the victim.
26. Support for this interpretation of the legislative intent behind the Civil
Rights Act of 1871 was derived from Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). There, the
United States Supreme Court extensively re-examined the legislative history of that
act. It concluded that Congress intended the law to provide a broad remedy for all
deprivations of civil rights. In the Court's view it is irrelevant that a state has a law
which provides relief; the federal remedy is independent of the state remedy and the
state remedy need not be tried before the federal one becomes available. Id. at 183.
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a way to provide the appropriate relief. It either had to imply a
wrongful death remedy from section 1983 itself, or find the neces
sary language in other statutes.
Rather than imply the remedy, the court "incorporated"27 the
state wrongful death statute into the section 1983 action. the pro
cedure was suggested by section 1988 of the Civil Rights Act 28
which authorizes federal district courts to draw on state law when
federal law is "deficient" and cannot adequately protect federally
guaranteed rights. The court reasoned that through section 1988
Congress intended to provide any necessary remedial 29 measures
not expressly granted in other civil rights statutes. 30 The sole lim iThe civil rights laws were enacted to provide a federal right in a federal forum
because by "reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise," state
laws might be inadequate or inadequately enforced, and the "claim of citizens to the
enjoyment of rights, privileges, and immunities guarantee.d by the Fourteenth
Amendment might be denied by the state agencies." 365 U.S. at 180. Thus, the Mon
roe Court did not perceive a congressional policy against a remedy for wrongful
death under § 1983. See note 30 infra for an explanation of state court jurisdiction
over § 1983 claims.
27. 293 F.2d at 405. The term "incorporation" means that the wrongful death
remedy of the state in which the § 1983 action is brought is available. In such cases,
the state created remedy becomes part of the federal cause of action. This situation is
distinguished from that in which the plaintiff has also asserted a state wrongful death
claim which is merged with the § 1983 claim. For an explanation of "merger" see
note 16 supra.
28. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (West Supp. 1977) provides in pertinent part:
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district courts
by the provisions of this chapter and Title 18, for the protection of all per
sons in the United States in their civil rights, and for their vindication, shall
be exercised and enforced in conformity with the Laws of the United States,
so far as such Laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases
where they are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions
necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against law, the
common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of
the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal
cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution
and Laws of the United States, shall be extended to and govern the said
courts in the trial and disposition of the cause, and, if it is of a criminal
nature, in the infliction of punishment on the party found guilty.
29. The term "remedial" is used because § 1988 does not create causes of ac
tion; it merely supplies necessary remedies incident to the rights protected in the
other civil rights statutes.
30. This applies to both federal and state courts hearing § 1983 claims. Once
jurisdiction has been established in a state court which enforces state claims similar
to claims established by federal law, the state court may not decline to enforce the
federal law, and must do so in the manner in which it would be enforced in the fed
eral courts. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947). See Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngs
town R. Co., 342 U.S. 359, 363 (1952).
Until recently it was unclear whether state courts have concurrent jurisdiction
with federal district courts over § 1983 claims. The United States Supreme Court
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tation on the use of relevant state law is that it must be consistent
"with the Constitution and laws of the United States. "31 Finding
the failure to provide a wrongful death remedy in section 1983 to be
a "deficiency," the Brazier court incorporated the state wrongful
death statute into the section 1983 action. It thereby created an
effective remedy for violations of federally protected rights.
Thus, the Brazier court developed a simple test to determine
when state remedies can be used by a federal court in a section
1983 action. The court first determines what is needed in a particu
lar case to make the Civil Rights Act fully effective. It then decides
whether section 1983 is "deficient" in furnishing the appropriate
remedy. If it is, the court is directed to look to relevant state law
to fill the gap in the federal provisions. Finally, if state law is avail
able to fill this gap, the court must be certain that the state law is
consistent with federal statutory and constitutional law. 32 State law
is used only to the extent that it is "currently available" to over
come the deficiencies in the federal statutory scheme. 33 The
Brazier court did not decide what approach should be taken when
section 1983 is deficient and the available state remedy is not con
sistent with federal policy, or otherwise leaves the plaintiff without
an effective remedy. Leaving this question aside for the moment, it
is enough to say that the reasoning in Brazier has been adopted by
other federal courts when dealing with wrongful death actions
brought under section 1983. 34

appears to have decided this issue sub silentio in Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1
(1976). In Aldinger, the Court indicated the plaintiff could have brought the § 1983
action in state court, along with the plaintiff's state claim. See Brody v. Leamy, 90
Misc. 2d 1, 393 N.Y.S.2d 243 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (the court grudgingly accepted jurisdic
tion over a § 1983 claim because of Aldinger, although by its own analysis it felt
state courts did not have jurisdiction over such claims).
31. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (West Supp. 1977). From a federal standpoint, the only
limitation upon the use of such adoptive state law, rule, or decision is that it must be
suitable to carry the civil rights law into effect because available direct federal legis
lation is deficient in furnishing fully effective redress. 293 F.2d at 409.
32. 293 F.2d at 409.
33. Id. at 408.
34. The following cases have allowed incorporation of state wrongful death
remedies into § 1983 actions to enable the personal representative of certain desig
nated beneficiaries or the beneficiaries themselves to bring an action for wrongful
death under the federal statute: Wolfer v. Thaler, 525 F.2d 977 (5th Cir.), cert. de
nied, 425 U.S. 975 (1976); Spence v. Staras, 507 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1974); Mattis V.
Schnarr, 502 F.2d 588 (8th Cir. 1974); Smith v. Wickline, 396 F. Supp. 555 (W.D.
Okla. 1975); James V. Murphy, 392 F. Supp. 641 (E.D. Ala. 1975); Love V. Davis, 353
F. Supp. 587 (W.D. La. 1973); Galindo v. Brownell, 255 F. Supp. 930 (S.D. Cal.
1966). The following courts have held that § 1983 claims which accrued during the
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Another Approach: Creating a Federal Coml1wn Law Cause of
Action for Wrongful Death in Maritime Law

Just as section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for
wrongful death, the maritime statutes do not make a remedy avail
able for wrongful deaths which occur on state territorial waters. 35
Federal courts sitting in maritime actions, just as those sitting in
section 1983 actions, have turned to state law to supply the missing
remedy. The development of maritime wrongful death remedies,
however, did not stop with incorporation of state law. Instead, fed
eral courts have gone on to create a federal common law wrongful
death remedy.
A review of this development is important for two reasons.
First, the maritime law provides an alternative approach which has
many analytical and practical advantages over incorporation. 36 Sec
ond, the Colorado Supreme Court in the instant case, Jones v. Hil
debrant, relied on a maritime case, The Tungus v. Skovgaard,37 to
support its holding that if state law is incorporated into federal law,
it must be incorporated as an integrated whole. 38 In view of the
results that federal courts have reached in subsequent maritime
cases, it is doubtful whether The Tungus was good law when the
Jones court turned to it for guidance.
In The Harrisburg ,39 the United States Supreme Court
applied to maritime law the rule that there is no common law ac
tion for wrongful death. 40 To alleviate the hardship worked by this
rule, courts have traditionally relied upon state wrongful death stat
utes in actions under maritime law. 41 As in Brazier, incorporation
of state law into the federal cause of action provided a remedy for
injury resulting in death in cases in which less serious injury would
otherwise have been actionable under the general maritime law.
However, courts left open the question whether state law could be
utilized in part or whether it had to be incorporated as a whole.
lifetime of the decedent do not abate at his death but survive to his estate according
to state law, via § 1988: Spence v. Staras, 507 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1974); Hall v.
Wooten, 506 F.2d 564 (6th Cir. 1974); Javits v. Stevens, 382 F. Supp. 131 (S.D.N.Y.
1974).
35. Deaths of merchant seamen and deaths of persons on the high seas are
covered by federal statutes. See note 60 infra.
36. See notes 58-61 infra and accompanying text.
37. 358 U.S. 588 (1959).
38. See note 98 infra.
39. 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
40. Id. at 204. See note 23 supra.
41. See text accompanying notes 42-44 infra.
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This was the issue before the Court in The Tungus v. Skov
gaard. 42 There, the plaintiff brought a suit for wrongful death
based on unseaworthiness. 43 The Supreme Court unanimously
agreed that when the maritime law leaves a survivor without a
remedy for a death on state territorial waters, the remedy may be
provided under any applicable state law granting a right of action
for wrongful death. The Court was divided, however, on whether
the state statute must be incorporated as a whole or whether
selected provisions could be independently incorporated while
others were ignored. The issue arose because the negligence stan
dard of care imposed on the defendant by the relevant New Jersey
statute was less stringent than that which would have been re
quired of him under federal maritime law had the injury not re
sulted in death. 44 The majority held that "when admiralty adopts a
State's right of action for wrongful death, it must enforce the right
as an integrated whole, with whatever conditions and limitations
the creating State has attached. "45 The Court found that the state
wrongful death statute encompassed an action under federal mari
time law, but that the duty of care was governed by state law.
The dissent would have held that federal maritime law could
utilize state law to supply the "right" to sue, without regard to any
substantive limitations contained in the state law. 46 It reasoned that
since the standard of care allegedly breached was one grounded in
federal law, that standard should not differ from state to state. "It
would be a strained statement of the effect of The Harrisburg" to
say that because there is no common law wrongful death remedy
under maritime law there is "no duty imposed by the maritime law
not to kill persons. . . . "47 Even where the injured party seeks to
enforce a state created remedy, federal standards should control. 48
42. 358 U.S. 588 (1959).
43. [d. at 589-90.
44. [d. at 594. Under maritime law the defendant owed the deceased the duty
to maintain the vessel in a seaworthy condition. A breach of the duty of seaworthi
ness establishes strict liability. Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944).
Under the state wrongful death statute, the defendant only owed the deceased the
duty to exercise ordinary care in maintaining a safe work area. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:
31-1 (West 1952).
45. 358 U.s. at 592. The Colorado Supreme Court in Jones v. Hildebrant relied
on The Tungus as authority for its ruling that the Colorado rule of damages applied
to a § 1983 action. See note 98 infra.
46. 358 U.S. at 597-99.
47. [d. at 601.
48. [d. at 601-02. See also Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 409
(1953). If federal standards were to control, the duty imposed under maritime law
would not differ from state to state, or otherwise, merely because the injury resulted
in death.
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"It is enough" that the state furnish the remedy "in a general way."
The right to maintain an action for wrongful death should be de
rived from state law without applying any substantive conditions
or limitations it might contain. 49 According to the dissent, the ma
jority decision was "contrary to one of the basic principles" of
law, 50 that similarly injured persons should be able to obtain
similar remedies. The anomalous result that different laws govern,
depending on whether conduct kills or merely injures its victims,
was a "conscious choice of a nonuniform solution on an essential
matter. "51
The issue debated in The Tungus was finally disposed of by
the Supreme Court in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc. 52
Moragne also involved an action for wrongful death based on un
seaworthiness. The case was before the Court on appeal from the
Florida Supreme Court. 53 Following the rule of The Harrisburg, 54
the Florida Supreme Court had looked to the state wrongful death
statute for a remedy. 55 It dismissed the action, however, because it
held that lack of ordinary care had not been pleaded or proved and
the state statute did not encompass a wrongful death action based
on unseaworthiness. 56 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
affirmed on the basis of The Tungus. 57 The plaintiff was left with
out a remedy since no wrongful death action could be maintained
directly under maritime law and the available state remedy proved
to be inadequate. Re-examining the ruling in The Hamsburg, and
noting the confusion resulting from its decision in The Tungus, the
United States Supreme Court overruled The Harrisburg and created
a common law action for wrongful death in federal maritime law. 58

49.

358 U.S. at 609.

50. ld. The dissent spoke in terms of admiralty law but the principle is equally
applicable to civil rights law. The extent of the role played by state law under The
Tungus decision had been the subject of substantial debate and uncertainty in the
Supreme Court, with opinions on both sides of the question acknowledging the
shortcomings in the law. See Hess v. United States, 361 U.S. 314 (1960), and Goett v.
Union Carbide Corp., 361 U.S. 340 (1960).
51. 358 U.S. at 609.
52. 398 U.S. 375 (1970). Instead of deciding whether partial incorporation of a
state statute is permissible, the Court circumvented the issue by creating a federal
common law action for wrongful death in maritime law. See text accompanying notes
57-58 infra.
53. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 211 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1968).
54. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
55. 211 So. 2d at 162.
56. ld. at 167.
57. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 409 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1969).
58. 398 U.S. at 388-90. At least two states have relied on Moragne in recogniz
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In a carefully reasoned decision, the Moragne Court noted the
analytical and practical difficulties of the old rule and discarded it
for several reasons. First, every state has enacted a wrongful death
statute. 59 This indicates that there is a uniform national policy of
providing a remedy for wrongful death. Second, the Court rec
ognized that Congress has provided for wrongful death actions in
some areas of federal law. 60 Thus, the Court did not perceive a
congressional policy against this type of remedy. Finally, it re
garded the rule of The Harrisburg as unacceptably cumbersome; it
had become an "increasingly unjustifiable anomaly" as the law over
the years had changed. Together with its corollary, The Tungus, it
had produced "litigation-spawning confusion in an area that should
be easily susceptible of more workable solutions. "61 Implicit in the
Court's rationale is the idea that when a federal right is asserted,
federal law should govern. 62 Further support for this idea is de
rived from several courts that have had the opportunity to interpret
the Brazier decision.

ing a wrongful death remedy of common law ongm. See Gaudette v. Webb, 362
Mass. 60, 284 N.E.2d 222 (1972); Barnette v. Butler Aviation Int'l, Inc., 89 Misc. 2d
350, 391 N.Y.S.2d 348 (Sup. Ct. 1977). But see Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 565
P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977), in which the court stated that it did not question
the soundness of Moragne but that it felt it could not follow Gaudette because it
was persuaded that the California legislature had intended to occupy the field of
recovery for wrongful death by enacting the state wrongful death statute. The court
held that the state legislature could, and did, modify the common law by enacting the
California wrongful death statute. [d. at 573-75, 565 P.2d at 128-29, 139 Cal. Rptr.
at 103-04.
Relying on Moragne, one district court has held that there is an "extension"
provision, as a matter of federal common law, similar to those found in state law, in
§ 502 of the Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (Supp. V
1975), although the remedy is ordinarily a creature of statute. Wayne Chern. v. Col
umbus Agency Servo Corp., 426 F. Supp. 316 (N.D. Ind. 1977).
59. 398 U.S. at 390. See Comment, Wrongful Death Damages in North
Carolina, 44 N.C. L. REV. 402 (1966).
60. Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-59 (1970) (wrongful death
of railroad employees); Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970) (of merchant seamen);
Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 761, 762 (1970) (of persons on the high
seas); Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.c. § 1346(b) (1970) (made the United States
subject to liability in certain circumstances for negligently caused wrongful death to
the same extent as a private person). The Moragne Court concluded that the Jones
Act and the Death on the High Seas Act were not intended to preclude the availabil
ity of a remedy for wrongful death under general maritime law in situations not
covered by those acts. 398 U.S. at 390-93.
61. 398 U.S. at 404.
62. [d. at 378, 404-05.
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BEYOND BRAZIER: CREATING FEDERAL COMMON
WHEN INCORPORATION OF STATE

LAw

LAw

DOES NOT

PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE REMEDY

In Jones v. Hildebrant, the Colorado Supreme Court ruled
that the damages recoverable in a wrongful death action brought
pursuant to section 1983 are controlled by state law. 63 The court
concluded that federal policy required the incorporation of the
state wrongful death remedy as an integrated whole. This percep
tion of federal policy is inaccurate. Federal courts will incorporate
state law when it is needed to provide an adequate remedy. How
ever, where total incorporation fails to accomplish this goal, the
courts have fashioned appropriate remedies ranging from the in
corporation of selected portions of state law to the creation of fed
eral common law.
This flexible approach is the outgrowth of the United States
•
Supreme Court's decision in Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park. 64 Sul
livan involved the availability of damages in a discrimination suit. 65
The suit was instituted under section 1982 of the Civil Rights Act66
which, like section 1983, makes no express provision for awarding
damages. The Court was persuaded, however, that the "existence
of a statutory right implies the existence of all necessary and ap
propriate remedies. "67 Interpreting section 1988 and the holding in
Brazier, the Court held that both federal and state rules on dam
ages may be used, whichever best serves the policies expressed in
the federal statutes. 68 "The rule of damages, whether drawn from
federal or state sources, is a federal rule responsive to the need
whenever a federal right is impaired. "69 Thus, the only limitation
63.

See text accompanying notes 14-18 supra.
396 U.S. 229 (1969).
65. Id. at 235-38. Plaintiff sued for discrimination in the disposition of property.
Little Hunting Park is a Virginia non-stock corporation operating playground
facilities and a community park for residents in an area of Fairfax County, Virginia. A
membership share entitles the shareholder to use the facilities, and, under the corpo
ration bylaws, when a member rents her home she may assign the membership
share. The board of directors of Little Hunting Park refused to approve the assign
ment because the plaintiff was black. I d. at 234-35.
66. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970) provides: "All citizens of the United States shall
have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens
thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property."
67. 396 U.S. at 239 (citations omitted).
68. Id. at 240. For an analogous approach see Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F.2d 401,
408-09 (1961).
69. 396 U.S. at 240 (emphasis added).
64.
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upon the use of state law is that it must be suitable to effect the
purposes of the civil rights laws. State law is used only to the ex
tent that it is available to overcome any deficiency in the federal
statute. 70 At least two federal courts of appeals have followed the
Sullivan approach and allowed recovery of punitive damages in sec
tion 1983 actions even when state law did not permit them.
Basista v. Weir 71 was an action brought pursuant to section
1983 for unlawful arrest and detention. 72 The issue before the court
was the availability of punitive damages. 73 Section 1983 is silent on
the kind of damages recoverable by an injured party. The statute
only states that the offending person "shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law."74 These words connote damages of
some kind, but the statute does not explain what kind. Since the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals had determined that the federal
common law was deficient on the issue of punitive damages, the
court followed the Brazier approach and looked to the applicable
state law. The state law did not allow punitive damages absent a
showing of actual damages. 75 Since the plaintiff had suffered no
actual damages, he would be entitled to recover only nominal dam
ages 76 if the state law were applied. The Third Circuit refused to
apply the state law, because it understood the injustice that could
result from applying federal common law to determine compensa
tory damages, while at the same time using state law to measure

70.
71.

293 F.2d at 408.
340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965).

72.

Id.

73. [d. at 87. Punitive, or exemplary, damages are damages awarded to the
plaintiff over and above bare compensation for property loss, where the wrong done
to him was aggravated by circumstances of violence, oppression, malice, fraud, or
wanton and wicked conduct on the part of the defendant. These damages are in
tended to give solace to the plaintiff for mental anguish, laceration of his feelings,
shame, degradation, or other aggravations of the original wrong; or else to punish the
defendant for his evil behavior or to make an example of him. BLACK'S LAW DIC
TIONARY 467-68 (rev. 4th ed. 1976).
74. 42 U.S.C. § 1983, reproduced at note 3 supra.
75. 340 F.2d at 87. Actual damages are synonymous with compensatory dam
ages and are "[rJeal, substantial and just damages, or the amount awarded to a com
plainant in compensation for his actual and real loss or injury. . . ." BLACK'S LAw
DICTIONARY 467 (rev. 4th ed. 1976).
76. 340 F.2d at 88. Nominal damages are a trifling sum awarded to a plaintiff in
an action in which there is no substantial loss or injury to be compensated. The law
recognizes a technical invasion of his rights or a breach of the defendant's duty.
Nominal damages are also awarded when the plaintiff proves a real injury, but the
evidence failed to show its amount. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 469 (rev. 4th ed.
1976).
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punitive damages. 77 The court recognized that the protection af
forded to individuals by section 1983 was not intended to differ from
state to state. Therefore, the amount of damages recovered by an in
jured party should not vary because of the law of the state in which
the federal suit was commenced. "Federal common law must be
applied to effect uniformity, otherwise the Civil Rights Acts would
fail to effect the purposes and ends which Congress intended. "78 As
a result of this analysis, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
held that federal law permitted the recovery of punitive damages
even in the absence of actual damages. 79
This ruling was followed by the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit in Spence v. Staras, 80 in which the plaintiff
brought wrongful death and survival actions pursuant to section
1983. 81 She sought actual as well as punitive damages for the death
of her nonverbal, mentally-ill son. As in Basista, the state law did
not allow punitive damages unless actual damages were first alleged
and proved. 82 Noting that actual damages would be difficult to
prove, the Seventh Circuit held that federal common law allows
punitive damages even in the absence of actual damages "[p]ro
vided certain aggravating circumstances are shown. "83 Applying
the rule of Sullivan,84 the court concluded that both federal
and state rules on damages could be used, whichever best served
the _policies behind the civil rights laws. 85 The Spence court, con
sistent with the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Basista, refused
to apply a state damage rule which limited the plaintiff's chances of
adequate recovery. By refusing to apply state punitive damage lim
itations, those courts have broadened the availability of suitable
relief to meet the needs of a particular case. In some cases this
"suitable remedy" approach has taken federal courts past the tech
nique of selective incorporation of state law. 86 For example, in a re
77.
78.

340 F.2d at 86.
Id. (footnote omitted).
79. Id. at 88.
80. 507 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1974).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 558 n.4.
83. Id. at 558. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals relied on Basista v. Weir,
340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965). See also Gill v. Manuel, 488 F.2d 799, 801-02 (9th Cir.
1973), and Caperci v. Huntoon, 397 F.2d 799 (1st Cir.), cert.denied, 393 U.S. 940
(1968).
84. See notes 64-65 supra and accompanying text.
85. 507 F.2d at 558.
86. It should make no difference whether it is a federal or state court. See note
30 supra.
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cent decision, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ignored
state law altogether and instead created federal common law to
prevent a section 1983 action from abating at the death of the
plaintiff.
In this decision, Shaw v. Garrison,87 the plaintiff sued James
Garrison, onetime New Orleans District Attorney, under section
1983 for an allegedly unlawful prosecution of Shaw for complicity
in the assassination of President Kennedy.88 After instituting the
action, the plaintiff died. 89 Following its own analysis in Brazier,
the court of appeals recognized that the civil rights statutes are
deficient in that they fail to provide for the survival of an action
after the death of a plaintiff. 90 Therefore, the court concluded that
the state survivorship law would apply unless that law was "in
consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States."91
Under state law,92 Shaw's suit would abate since he had no stat
utory survivors.93 The court therefore refused to apply the state
law, reasoning that it was inconsistent with the broad remedial
purposes embodied in the civil rights laws. It viewed the civil
rights statutes as "designed to insure to all citizens" the right to
-be free from deprivations of constitutionally secured civil rights. 94
Since the state law in Shaw was unable to provide the relief en
visioned by Congress in enacting section 1983, the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit looked beyond it and held that the action
survived in favor of Shaw's estate as a matter of federal common
law. 95
87. 545 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1977).
88. Id. at 981.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 983. This should not be confused with survival actions brought by the
survivors of the deceased in their representative capacity. Other courts, including the
United States Supreme Court, have reached the same conclusion as that reached by
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Shaw. Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S.
693, 702 n.14 (1973); Pritchard v. Smith, 289 F.2d 153, 155 (8th Cir. 1961).
91. 545 F.2d at 983 (quoting § 1988).
92. Id. at 981.
93. Id. at 980.
94. Id. at 983.
95. Support for this decision was derived from the United States Supreme
Court's interpretation of the authority granted by § 1988. In Moor v. County of
Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973), the Supreme Court held that state law can be used
only if it is consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States. Id. at
706. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (West Supp. 1977), reproduced at note 28 supra. Since
the civil rights statutes are laws of the United States, the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit concluded that Congress was concerned about the possibility of hostile
state law interfering with the policy and purposes of the civil rights laws. 545 F.2d at
983.
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From cases such as Sullivan, Basista, Spence, and Shaw, the
willingness of federal courts to fashion appropriate remedies for
civil rights violations is apparent. The federal judiciary has consis
tently maintained a flexible approach. If state law is beneficial to
the plaintiff's cause of action in one respect but adverse to it in
another, the federal courts will ignore those state provisions which
restrict the plaintiff's ability to obtain a meaningful remedy. In
cases where state law is totally unavailable, the courts have
fashioned suitable remedies by creating federal common law to fill
the gaps in the federal provisions. Whatever the facts of the case
may be, the policy of federal courts is to do what is necessary to
effect the purposes of the civil rights laws.
III.

JONES

v.

HILDEBRANT IN LIGHT OF FEDERAL PRECEDENTS

It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the Supreme
Court of Colorado did not understand how federal courts approach
the difficult problems in federal-state relations that are involved
when a plaintiff seeks recovery for wrongful death under the fed
eral civil rights statutes. The Colorado Supreme Court agreed with
Mrs. Jones that section 1983 permits the incorporation of state
wrongful death statutes into section 1983 actions. 96 However, since
the action was brought in state court and joined with a state claim
under the state wrongful death statute, the court held that the two
claims had "merged,"97 and dismissed the section 1983 claim.
The court based its reasoning on a belief that even if the suit
had been brought in federal court, relief would have been provided
according to a wholly incorporated state statute. 98 Thus, in the
view of the Colorado Supreme Court, the state remedy was
"broader" because it, unlike section 1983, allowed the City and
County of Denver to be sued. Section 1983 was in no sense
broader because "whole incorporation" imposed the dollar limita
tion of the state remedy on ahy potential recovery under section
1983. In reaching this result, the court relied on The Tungus,
96. 550 P.2d at 343.
97. Id. at 344. The only reason given for the merger and dismissal was that the
state claim provided a broader remedy because it allowed recovery against the City
and County of Denver. Id. at 344 n.7. The merger and dismissal is a major source of
confusion in the Colorado Supreme Court decision. See note 18 supra and accom
panying text.
98. 550 P.2d at 344 n.8. Citing The Tungus, the court stated its own ruling
accords "with what appears to be the federal policy of wholly incorporating state
wrongful death remedies when incorporation of state law is the Congressional in
tent."
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which held that state law must be incorporated as an integrated
whole, even when the law puts substantive limitations on the plain
tiff's right to recover. 99
However, the Colorado Supreme Court did not recognize sev
eral major developments in federal law since The Tungus was de
cided in 1959. First, by overruling The Harrisburg, and creating
federal common law, Moragne has substantially weakened the
"whole incorporation" rule of The Tungus. 100 The rule of The Tun
gus is no longer applied in maritime law, the context in which it
was formulated. In Moragne, moreover, the Supreme Court inti
mated that it was adopting the position of The Tungus dissent: that
liability for the breach of a federally imposed duty should not be
subject to potential differences in state law. lol
Many federal courts have recognized that in enacting section
1983, Congress intended to create a federal cause of action separate
from the remedies afforded under state law,102 and therefore that
state law should not be used to limit the recovery available under
the federal statute. Those courts have taken a very flexible approach
in section 1983 actions, "incorporating" state law only to the extent
necessary to effect the policy behind the civil rights statutes. When
incorporation of state law cannot provide the injured party with a
suitable remedy, a remedy will be fashioned as a matter of federal
common law.
The state law used in Jones v. Hildebrant was helpful since it
provided the plaintiff with a "right" to bring her suit. State laws
should be used to that extent only. Federal rules of damages
should apply instead of the diverse rules of damages found in the
state wrongful death laws. Local concerns reflected in state statutes
which would bar or substantially limit the plaintiff's chance of re
covery should give way to the policies expressed in the civil rights
laws.
The Colorado statute, together with its net pecuniary loss limi
tation, does not provide adequate redress in a situation in which,
as in Jones, the financial loss suffered as a result of death is merely
intangible. l03 This type of damage rule should not be permitted

99. 358 U.S. at 592.
100. See notes 57-58 supra and accompanying text.
101. Compare Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 405 (1970),
with The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588, 602 (1959).
102. See note 26 supra.
103. 550 P.2d at 341-42. The Colorado net pecuniary loss rule bars recovery for
loss of society and punitive damages. Mrs. Jones' provable damages consisted of fu
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to control in a section 1983 suit. "The rule of damages, whether
drawn from federal or state sources, is a federal rule responsive to
the need whenever a federal right is impaired. "104
IV.

CONCLUSION

To avoid potential differences in allowable damages, a simple
solution is available: the creation of a common law wrongful death
action under federal law. There is little difference between creating
federal common law to avoid abatement of a section 1983 action at
the plaintiff's death, as was done in Shaw v. Garrison, and creating
federal common law to allow actions for wrongful death under sec
tion 1983.
The benefits of the civil rights laws were intended to be uni
form throughout the United States. Those benefits should not be
impaired because conduct results in death rather than serious in
jury. In addition, choice of a federal or state forum should not affect
the protection afforded by section 1983. 105 Adoption of a federal

neral expenses plus the value of her son's services she lost as a result of his death.
These damages were offset by the expenses the plaintiff would have incurred in
raising him. See note 10 supra.
. '
104. 396 U.S. at 240 (emphasis added).
105. The reluctance of state courts to grant relief under § 1983 is an important
concern in view of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Aldinger v. Howard,
427 U.S. 1 (1976). In Aldinger, the Court refused to accept pendent party jurisdiction
over a § 1983 plaintiff's state law claim against the county that employed the plain
tiff. Since a plaintiff would normally choose to proceed against both individual and
governmental defendants in one forum, the effect of Aldinger is to force § 1983 claims
into the state courts. For a discussion of Aldinger and pendent party jurisdiction see
Note, 87 YALE L.J. 627 (1978).
The Aldinger decision, however, left open the question whether a local govern
mental unit can be sued directly under the fourteenth amendment. Thus, one avenue
that remains open to a § 1983 plaintiff is to also assert a fourteenth amendment claim
against the city or county. A federal court can accept pendent jurisdiction over the
state law claim because the city or county is already a party to the federal suit. See,
e.g., Gagliardi v. Flint, 564 F.2d 112 (3d Cir. 1977) (after basing jurisdiction on a
"substantial" fourteenth amendment question, the court addressed the state law
claim against the city rather than the more difficult fourteenth amendment issue).
If the Supreme Court should decide that a local governmental unit cannot be sued
directly under the fourteenth amendment, then state courts will provide the only
forum in which a § 1983 plaintiff can sue the individual defendant alld his or her
city or county employer.
Jones v. Hildebrant is the only case the author found in which a state court
awarded damages to a § 1983 plaintiff. Since the federal and state claims were
merged in JOlles, see note 97 supra and accompanying text, the award was probably
based on the state claim. Writing in 1969, one commentator noted that he could find
no state decision awarding relief under § 1983. He further observed that state courts
usually adopt the expedient of accepting jurisdiction over such claims while dismiss
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common law rule allowing wrongful death actions under section
1983 without regard to state law is desirable since it would foster
the uniform application of the statute. As the Supreme Court con
cluded, "federal courts may use any available remedy to make good
the wrong done. "106 The creation of federal common law is an avail
able remedy which should be used.

Michael]. Houlihan
iug them on the merits. See Note, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1486, 1497 n.62 (1969). In a re
cent New York decision, the court did just that. Brody v. Leamy, 90 Misc. 2d 1, 393
N.Y.S.2d 243 (Sup. Ct. 1977). See also note 30 supra.
Dissatisfaction with the present scope of § 1983 has led one commentator to
suggest that the statute be amended to allow suits against state and local govern
ments. See Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposals to Strengthen the Section
1983 Damage Remedy for Law Enforcers' Misconduct, 87 YALE L.J. 447, 455-57 n.38
(1978).
106. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946) (footnote omitted).

